The Politics of Trauma by Humphrey, Michael & Policy at the University of Sydney, Professor of Sociology and Chair of the Department of Sociology and Social
The Politics of Trauma 
MICHAEL HUMPHREY* 
My subject, the politics of trauma, touches on a wide range of issues 
that have been part of my research agenda for some time. The 
trajectory of my research interests has taken me to a lot of places that 
have experienced political crisis and large-scale violence. They have 
included popular religious culture in North West Frontier Province in 
Pakistan, dispute regulation amongst Lebanese Muslim immigrants 
coming from the civil war, political Islam in Lebanon, the truth politics 
of transition and human rights in post-apartheid South Africa, and 
(with my wife Estela Valverde) post-dictatorship in Argentina and 
Uruguay, and the role of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (lCTY) in post-conflict Bosnia. This lecture will 
focus on the politics of trauma in this context of political transition. 
A couple of weeks ago I was attending a conference on Human 
Rights and Democratisation in Buenos Aires. I was in a taxi with 
my wife and two other conference participants, one of whom was a 
very well-known member of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, Nora 
Morales de Cortmas. We said to the taxi driver, 'Do you realize you 
are driving one of the Mothers to dinner?' He was absolutely thrilled 
and immediately asked her: 'I had an uncle who disappeared in 1959, 
have you been able to identify all the remains of people you have 
found?' The Mothers' campaign to find out what had happened to 
the Disappeared referred to the repression of 1976-1983, not to the 
victims of earlier dictatorships. What was the taxi driver imagining, 
that the bones of victims of state repression were stacked in layers 
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\",ailing to be identified? For me, his question conjured up an image 
of an Argentina haunted by the Disappeared of many violent events 
stretching back into the past. For him, the Mothers represented a 
source of truth. They had managed to unmask the truth about what 
had happened to the 30,000 persons who disappeared and now 
they were identifying their remains. His question effectively handed 
the Mothers the historical role of exhuming the entire past of state 
repression in Argentina. He went on to reveal an even longer family 
hbtory of the experience of repression, dating back to the Second 
World War in the Soviet Union. He was originally from a German 
colony in the Caucasus and his family had been transported to 
Kazakhstan when the German army invaded in 1941. His family had 
arrived in Argentina as refugees from the Soviet Union. His family's 
memory had never entered the collective memory, the memory of 
the state. 
The idea of trauma has become a key theme in contemporary 
politics because of the way it brings violence to the surface of history. 
Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman refer to the 'age of anxiety'. 1 
History is less concemed with heroes but has become more interested 
in the history of victims. The comments of the former Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard on the balance between the heroic versus 
victim version of Australian history highlight the shift. He criticised 
the 'black armband version of history' as focusing on the victims 
of colonisation instead of celebrating the achievements of British 
settlement. A similar criticism has been made of the new national 
secondary school history curriculum as being too heavily focussed 
on indigenous Australian aboriginal history. Our focus on the 
victims rather than the victors, Fassin and Rechtman suggest, has 
changed our relationship to history; it has tumed tragic.2 
Trauma is not just a bodily experience; it refers to an underlying 
traumatic event. Clinical psychology constructs trauma as a symptom 
of a disturbing experience which has not been psychologically digested, 
an event which is unassimilable as memory, and overthrows temporal 
sequence by collapsing the past into the present. Psychologically 
this became known as PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) and 
originally was viewed as a symptom of bodily weakness. PTSD was 
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identified as a syndrome only during the Vietnam war (although 
references to shell shock from the First World War indicate military 
medicine has been aware of the psychological distress caused by 
combat for some time). But trauma has undergone an historical shift 
from clinical to public recognition. Trauma is no longer simply a 
medical condition recognized by professionals and clinicians but an 
expression of our humanity, able to be recognized by the public. The 
victim is seen to embody our humanity. 
It is in the name of this vestige of humanity that compensation is 
demanded for damage suffered, that witnesses testify against all forms 
of oppression, and that proofs of cruelty endured are brought forward.3 
The traumatic event becomes culturally emblematic as collective 
memory, framing what values are important and what is politically 
and morally at stake. John Howard's strong identification with 
September 11, and the fact that he was visiting the US at the time, led 
him to refer to the Bali bombings as our 'September 11', as if we needed 
such an awesome and catastrophic event to define or sharpen our 
sense of national identity. These large emblematic traumatic events 
are also a moment for public mobilisation and identification, bringing 
people together. This is occurring nationally but also transnationally. 
Trauma relates to the experience of violence and traces of violence 
in the body. There is a whole industry of professionals that has grown 
up around making trauma visible, making victims visible to others 
and making victims conscious of themselves as victims. The media 
playa big role in making victims visible and generating discourses of 
victimhood. Trauma can now quickly shift from being an existential 
experience to an identity, to victimhood. People are made conscious 
of their victimhood through identification with other victims. The 
human rights discourse can reinforce victimhood by constructing the 
subject position of victim in opposition to the perpetrator. 
Trauma has become a source of legitimacy derived from the 
authenticity of suffering, the truth of personal testimony and, as 
Paul Ricoeur argues, an expression of the affective roots of injustice.4 
Trauma is no longer seen as a sign of weakness but as a sign of 
resilience. Victims demand legal reparation in the name of unjust 
suffering. They seek moral recognition for their suffering. Their bodies 
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become the source of proof. Trauma is expressed on the basis of a 
shared humanity based in human rights and suffering. It becomes a 
:,uurce of political visibility in the sense that the victim is constmcted 
as the product of a particular event. Trauma is the lens through 
which other legal and moral claims are made. It frames violence and 
interprets its effects. 
This paper argues that violence is made visible in the victim 
through the combination of two lenses, the trauma lens and human 
rights lens, serving as universalizing discourses and creating the 
basis for formal equality. The trauma lens is universalizing based 
on our shared experience of the body as a source of suffering and 
pain; the human rights lens is universalizing based on our shared 
humanity. Suffering produces the possibility of moral recognition, 
rights produce the possibility of everyone being included in the same 
community. However, while the trauma lens is universalizing through 
the shared ontology of the body, it is also a moral vision and is used 
to determine who has rights. In other words, it is a moral vision that 
selects who deserves to be recognised. The trauma lens creates the 
possibility of recognition and at the same time produces a moral 
economy to determine who is deserving - for example, the innocent 
victim as most deserving. This lecture focuses on the use of trauma 
and the human rights lens as universalizing discourses in situations 
of political transition from repression or internal conflict to democratic 
politics. I will explore the tmth commission, an institution promoted 
to manage the legacies of conflict by the transitional justice industry, 
and briefly consider the example of refugees to demonstrate the way 
the trauma lens has become a pervasive vehicle for governmentality. 
Truth commissions 
Tmth commissions are increasingly used to manage the legacies 
of conflict in situations of political and military stalemate. They 
have become part of the standard operating procedure in peace 
agreements, transitional justice programs, and democratization, and 
are increasingly used as a form of political triage in any situation 
of political violence where impunity prevails. The South African 
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the be~t known truth 
commission, commenced in 1996 but it was not the first. There were 
more than 20 earlier truth commissions in Africa and Latin Americ(I 
- including one held in Rwanda in 1992 before the genocide! The 
challenge of truth commissions has been to balance demands of 
victims for justice and accountability with the risk prosecutions 
present to political normalisation. 
The suffering victim has been made the centrepiece of truth 
commissions as the source of embodied truth. Suffering and testimony 
give visibility to the violent crimes committed, even if the truth of who 
did it remains unknown or the evidence to prove culpability is lacking. 
When you put the victim at the centre you produce violence stories. 
The violence story contains a plot with key elements: the weapon, the 
wound and the community. The weapon refers to the perpetrator, the 
wound to the victim and the community to the morality transgressed. 
The meaning of the story shifts between a therapeutic and justice 
perspective according to which elements of the plot prevail. The more 
the violence, the weapon, is downplayed, the more the victim's rights 
are diminished in favour of a therapeutic focus on needs. 
Truth commissions have emphasised moral recognition of the victim 
over justice. But what determines which victims are recognized? In 
the TRC, victims were invited to make written submissions to the 
Victims' Hearings - around 21,000 were submitted. These statements 
were classified according to the gravity of the human rights violation 
suffered by the victim. However, the victims of apartheid were 
narrowly defined - those who had personally experienced violence, 
not the much larger category of victims who had suffered from the 
large-scale collective crimes of apartheid such as segregation, mass 
population relocation and unequal development. Only ten per cent of 
victims who submitted statements to the Victims' Hearings actually 
got to give their testimonies to the Victims' Hearings in public. They 
were selected on the emblematic nature of their stories which fitted 
the chronology of well-known events of apartheid repression to be 
investigated: some were high profile victims, but mostly female 
relatives gave their testimonies - for example, the Cradock Four, the St 
James Church Massacre, the Murder of Amy Biehl, the Murder of Steve 
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Biko. Individual memory contributed to the production of a collective 
memory about the crimes of apartheid and the new post-apartheid 
South Africa. In order to produce this consensus Bishop Tutu, the 
Chair of the TRC, blurred the distinction between victims by declaring 
that 'We are all victims of Apartheid'. He put aside the questions 
about differential moral responsibility, what the anti-Apartheid 
struggle was about, and the impact of the compromises made on 
reconciliation and justice during transition between the National 
Party and the African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela. 
Truth commissions have been problematic because they have 
selected the kind of victims who are heard and the kind of victims 
who are recognised. This official construction and recognition of 
the victim is a mode of governance. Power inscribed on the body 
as pain is one mode of governance, as Foucault has argued;5 another 
is the appropriation and definition of the meaning of pain inscribed 
on the body. In other words, the state's management of political 
transition has sought to determine the meaning of suffering as 
part of a new national project and mode of governance. 'Private 
memory' contributes to making 'collective memory' as the official 
memory of the state. In this process a distinction is made between 
the 'individual and the collective, between the govemmentality it 
imposes on the former and the cohesion it provides for the latter'.6 
The truth commission differentiates between victims and recognises 
those who can contribute to producing a politically viable consensus. 
The truth commission's focus on the victim implies culpability 
- someone caused the trauma. However, they have diminished the 
human rights lens by either neglecting the question of culpability or 
generalizing it. Their reports have listed the victims but rarely the 
perpetrators. This is particularly the case with the Nunca Mas (Never 
Again) reports in Latin America. They investigate and report what 
happened to victims but not who was responsible for the human rights 
violations. Focusing on the victim, the wound, and not the weapon, 
the perpetrator, they sidestep the question of responsibility. At the 
same time that truth commissions blur the question of responsibility 
they seek to forge a political consensus in the present about the past 
for the future. The selective recognition of victims is integral to the 
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production of that consensus and to closure. 
Truth politics is very much concerned with victimhood. The 
terms used in relation to truth politics - justice, reconciliation, truth, 
amnesty, memory, victirnhood, recognition, forgiveness, healing -
all address a moment of change, a negotiation about how we move 
from where we are to somewhere else. And who is going to pay 
the price? Victims often point out that they are being asked to bear 
the burdens of peaceful transition - they give the testimonies, they 
are asked to forgive, and they get little recognition or material 
compensation. 'We pay the price and we do the work.' There is a real 
imbalance between perpetrator and victim, and also the beneficiaries 
(which I will return to later) in bringing about reconciliation and 
closure on the past. The politics of victimhood tries to address political 
violence by dealing with its effects rather than its causes. 
The theme of unresolved trauma and the cost of impunity in 
post-dictatorship Argentina is captured in a Personal Notice placed 
in a left-wing daily in Buenos Aires, Ptigina/12, in January 2005. 
The notice marks the anniversary of the disappearance of Hilda 
Adriana Fernandez during the dictatorship in January 1977. The 
notice informs us about her disappearance by the ironic comment 
- 'visited ESMA'. ESMA refers to the infamous Naval Mechanics 
School that functioned as a clandestine Detention Centre where 
'death flights' took drugged (disappeared) prisoners and dumped 
them from aircraft into the sea. The memorial notice states: 'When I 
hear about all the things happening to youth today, I remember you'. 
A list of well-known traumatic events includes: the dictatorship and 
the 30,000 Disappeared; the Malvinas War (where young conscripts 
needlessly died as a result of negligence); Kheyvis (a night club fire 
where 17 youths died in December 1993 through negligence); Police 
trigger-happy policy (police violence against adolescents, especially 
in the poor suburbs); 'suicide' in police detention (police repression 
in prison); Republica Cromafi6n (a nightclub fire in 2005 where 194 
died and 714 were injured because of official neglect and corruption). 
The notice ends, 'We don't forget or forgive. Naomi your sister.' 
Political transition, the truth politics and the suspended trials had 
not bought closure for many people, especially those most directly 
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affected. The memorial notice highlights continuing distrust of justice 
in Argentina, continuing impunity (impunidad) and the ongoing 
sacrifice of the youth of Argentina as a result of state repression and 
corruption. The trauma lens is used to remind us of all the young 
victims whose rights have been ignored or denied. 
One of the problems with political transition in Argentina was the 
political compromise forced on the Alfonsin government after the 
National Commission on Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) 
which led to the prosecution and successful conviction of high profile 
leaders of the dictatorship. CONADEP produced the Nunca Mas 
report and awarded compensation to families of the Disappeared. 
However, conflict over reconciliation and compensation split the 
famous human rights organisation, the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo.7 They divided over the issue of whether or not personal 
reconciliation and acceptance of compensation and the remains 
of relatives (if identified by forensic tests) amounted to a betrayal 
of the cause of justice for all the Disappeared. One group, Linea 
Fundadora (Founding Line), accepted compensation and focused on 
memorialisation and documentation of the Disappeared. The other 
group, Asociaci6n (Association), rejected reparation, demanded the 
return of the Disappeared and called the other Mothers 'prostitutes' 
for accepting it. They felt individual mourning and personal closure 
de-politicised the Mothers and undermined the collective cause of 
justice for all the Disappeared. 
In the truth commission the trauma lens has been used to 
produce a hierarchy of victims through selective recognition of and 
compensation for those seen as most deserving. Victim recognition is 
shaped by the capacity of individual stories to contribute to collective 
memory, the official memory articulated in the truth commission 
report. Political transition in Chile produced a hierarchy of victims 
through the recognition of the victims of particular crimes and not 
others. In 1990 the new democratic government launched a National 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1990-91 (also known as 
the Rettig Commission) to investigate 3,400 cases of death during 
the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-90), arising from disappearances 
after arrest, executions, and torture leading to death committed by 
44 
government agents or people in their service, as well as kidnappings 
and attempts on the life of persons carried out by private citizens 
for political reasons.8 The families of the victims, constructed as 
innocents, were compensated through pension, health, education, 
and housing benefits. Unlike the TRC the hearings were brief and 
not held in public. It was not until 2005, fourteen years later, that 
the National Commission on Imprisonment and Torture (2004-05) 
could investigate crimes against political prisoners. The first part of 
the report was released in 2004, the second part was finished in 2005 
and was classified as secret and not to be opened for 50 years. The 
report was based on 28,459 testimonies, and the state granted lifelong 
pensions and health benefits to victims. 
Coming out of the slow-paced truth politics of Colombia is 
the 'Victims' Rights Act', passed in June 2009. The law has been 
strongly criticised by national human rights organizations, Amnesty 
International and the UN High Commissioner Navanethem Pillay 
for discriminating between victims of paramilitary group violence 
and victims of state violence. Under this law victims of illegal 
armed groups can apply for compensation through administrative 
procedures while victims of state violence can only be compensated 
after proving before a judge that a State official committed the crime.9 
The law establishes a clear hierarchy of victims based on impunity for 
agents of the state. It also limits the period of claims for victims and 
closes off claims for compensation from future human rights violations 
and ignores the illegal gains of violence - for example, the restitution 
of millions of hectares stolen by paramilitary groups, especially 
from indigenous populations. The law, the government announced, 
provided compensation for the victims out of solidarity, not justice. 
Here the trauma lens is used to justify selective compensation where 
the human rights lens addressing legal responsibility is put aside. 
The trauma lens circumscribes the scope of human rights 
investigations and selectively determines which victims' testimonies 
will contribute to collective memory. During political transition, truth 
commissions have become a recommended ingredient in the recipe for 
democratisation by lending legitimacy to the successor state. But truth 
commissions have not brought closure on the past so much as served 
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as vehicles for producing a political consensus through the victims. 
The political problem is that this consensus does not necessarily 
endure. Major cleavages emerge between victims/families of the 
victims and the rest of society not so directly affected by the violence 
over the continued pursuit of accountability and justice. Victims' 
groups also divide over their post-repression human rights goals, as 
in the case of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. In fact the engine of 
human rights politics and continuing demands for accountability is 
the politics of victimhood - the victims and their families. Because 
truth commissions have generally not led to trials but usually to 
degrees of amnesty, demands for redistributive justice, especially the 
idea that the beneficiaries of the previous injustice should contribute, 
stand little chance of success. 
With growing distance from events the trauma lens loses its 
capacity to mobilise support for human rights abuses. For example, 
the persistence of the amnesty law in Uruguay can be understood 
as the weakening of the trauma lens. The case of Uruguay points 
to contradictions between the legitimacy of law and the authority 
of democratic processes. The return of democracy in Uruguay 
was the result of a negotiated agreement (Naval Club Agreement 
1984) between the key political parties and the military leadership. 
Amnesty was part of that agreement, at first for the political prisoners 
- around 20-25 per cent of the population was imprisoned at some 
period during the dictatorship - and soon after, a reciprocal amnesty 
was legislated by the new democratic government under President 
Sanguinetti in 1986 to protect the military. 10 Interestingly, the amnesty 
law has been democratically ratified by referendum twice: in 1989 
and 2009 a campaign to annul the law failed, receiving 43 per cent 
and 47 per cent of votes respectively. Moreover, both conservative 
and left-wing governments have left the amnesty law on the books 
until today because of the electoral risk it was seen to represent. In 
1989 reciprocal amnesty, fear of the past returning and fear of the 
consequences of exploring the past defeated the campaign to annul 
the law. In 2009 the campaign to annul the amnesty law, driven again 
by the victims of repression, was defeated by a combination of the 
younger generation's disconnection from past violence, which the 
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state had not publicly investigated or reconciled, and the preference 
of a large section of society to leave the past alone. As Jose Miguel 
Vivanco, America's director at Human Rights Watch, said in response 
to the loss of the plebiscite - 'accountability is not a popularity contest 
that should be decided by majorities'.ll Amnesty as political consensus 
has prevailed in Uruguay, resulting in public closure of the past and 
the neglect of a collective memory about the political meaning of 
the dictatorship and repression. Nevertheless, judicial activism led 
to the prosecution, on a case by case basis, of some key leaders - for 
example, the successful prosecution of de facto president Juan Maria 
Bordaberry and his foreign minister, Juan Carlos Blanco.12 
Addressing past violence through the trauma and human rights 
lenses does not usually get to the heart of the conflict. To look at 
dictatorship and repression as an issue of suffering and human rights 
violation severely limits the possibility of understanding the origins 
of conflict and political violence. Thus the story of the Disappeared in 
Argentina is not just one of human rights violations but the product 
of the history of the role of the military in power, the emergence of 
revolutionary movements to challenge corrupt politicians and state 
power, and the impact of Cold War politics. In transitional justice 
politics, the causes and origins of the conflict often get lost or become 
concealed because they are too hard to deal with. 
Robert Meister argues that the underlying pattern of conflict in 
the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century is divided 
between the politics of resentment and the politics of grievance.13 
He identifies two perspectives on past conflict in political transition: 
the revolutionary perspective and the counter-revolutionary 
perspective. The revolutionary perspective is about removing the 
regime in power, prosecuting the perpetrators and also overturning 
the social privilege of the beneficiaries of past injustice. This ongoing 
revolutionary pursuit of criminal justice and redistributive justice is 
precisely what the truth politics have sought to avoid by recognising 
victims and reassuring the beneficiaries of injustice that they will 
not become the targets of revenge. The truth politics of transition 
condemns violence, and democratic process renders it illegitimate. 
Meister calls this the politics of counter-revolution, or the politics 
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of resentment, which seeks to balance the fear of the beneficiaries 
of injustice and the desire of the victims for revenge. When in 1986 
the leading Argentine generals of the dictatorship were brought to 
trial they felt betrayed by the public and singled out as 'scapegoats'. 
From their perspective much of the Argentine public had accepted 
the dictatorship's National Security doctrine and looked away from 
the effects of the policy of state terror through mass disappearance. 
Their support for the regime was captured in the common submissive 
response to reports of disappearance during the dictatorship, alga 
habran hecha (they must have done something!). 
The politics of transition creates the categories of perpetrators, 
victims and beneficiaries of injustice. It seeks to persuade the 
beneficiaries of injustice - those who accepted, supported or colluded 
with the repression - to embrace democratic politics and support 
the new regime. The fear of the beneficiaries is that their moral 
recognition of the victims (your suffering was wrong) is not enough 
for the victims who continue to want justice, not just the recognition 
of their injuries and suffering. Transitional justice becomes a 'just 
enough' project, not too much and not too little, in order not to upset 
the process of democratisation by provoking a reactionary backlash. 
Meister's insight is that the underlying issues of the conflict remain 
unresolved within the human rights and transitional justice approach. 
In the politics of transition, amnesty laws sideline the trauma 
and human rights lenses by preventing accountability and public 
contestation over collective memory. Eventually, victims succeed 
little-by-little in gaining recognition of their trauma, and contest 
public memory through the right to know - truth telling and, if 
possible, accountability through the courts. However, amnesty laws 
can delay the process of opening up history to public scrutiny across 
generations. The Spanish case reveals the profound impact amnesty 
laws can have on preventing historical reconciliation. 
In Spain the Amnesty Law 1977 imposed the 'don't ask, don't tell' 
solution on the transition to democracy after Franco's death. The 
Amnesty Law granted an 'equitable impunity' to political prisoners 
and to the military and security forces. Ricard Vinyes describes its 
design as an 'amnesty of all for all, a forgetting of all for all, a profound 
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erasure designed to touch everyone an.d the whole sociely'.14 What 
has brought the issue of the crimes of the Franco regime to the 
political surface is the Law of Historical Memory. This law, passed 
in 2007, opened up the possibility of exploring the truth of the past 
by establishing the right of victims / families of victims to know what 
happened. The Law challenges the collective memory, what Ricard 
Vinyes calls Ia buena memoria (the 'good memory')15 that ensured 
conflicting memories remained private and subordinated to the 
production of public memory, the memory of the state. The civil war 
was historically digested in other terms - it was 'a fratricidal tragedy' 
or the result of 'difficult modernization and democratic failure'.16 
The Law of Historical Memory was the political outcome of a 
grassroots movement around local exhumations of mass graves, 
drawing on local knowledge about past atrocities. It began to 
organise with the formation of the Association for the Recuperation 
of Historical Memory by a journalist, Emilio Silva Barrera, whose 
grandfather was a victim of Falangist violence in 1936,17 The 
movement disinterred graves to try to identify the remains using DNA 
techniques. The impetus to recognise victims of the civil war, however, 
had begun much earlier. Since governments could not pass laws 
addressing Republican victims of Franco's repression directly, they 
did so indirectly through administrative reparations. The Republican 
victim was recognised as an object of bodily suffering entitled to 
financial compensation. Between 1977 and 2007, laws, ordinances 
and decrees step-by-step expanded the categories for financial 
compensation - for example, Law 5/1979 awarded pensions, medical 
assistance and pharmaceutical benefits to the children and families 
of victims of the civil war.18 Successive governments, however, 
never managed to address the issue of financial compensation head on 
once and for all. Economic reparation was individual and symbolic, 
and never managed to broach the larger questions of political or 
moral reparations. 
The Law of Historical Memory represented a major break coming 
out of a victims' rights movement. It was a law for moral reparations, 
for reconstruction of personal and family memory and personal family 
of the victims. Its purpose was purely testimonial: to reveal what 
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happened, where it happened and who did what to whom. However, 
in October 2008 prosecutor Baltasar Garzon extended the scope of the 
law by launching investigations into 114,266 cases of disappearance 
that occurred between 1936 and 1952 and ordered the exhumation 
of nineteen mass graves.19 Right-wing opponents accused him of 
being one-sided, investigating only the crimes against Republicans, 
not the crimes of Republicans - for example, the murders of priests 
and nuns - and, more importantly, reaching beyond his judicial 
authority. His initiative to investigate the Franco regime's 'crimes 
against humanity' provoked a right-wing reaction which resulted 
in his prosecution for exceeding his judicial authority and, as a 
consequence, being suspended from the Audiencia Nacional (Central 
Criminal Court). Politically his actions represented a challenge to 
the whole transitional process based on amnesty and amnesia. The 
paradoxical twist was that, in response to these charges, the Argentine 
government, in solidarity with Garzon, would itself investigate 
the crimes against humanity committed by the Franco regime. 
Garzon had previously challenged the Amnesty law in Argentina 
by successfully prosecuting two Argentine military officers in 
Spanish courts for crimes against humanity. As a reciprocal gesture 
the Argentine government was now investigating the crimes of 
dictatorship in Spain. 
The moral economies of trauma obscure the conflict behind the 
human rights lens. They fail to address the questions of why the 
violence occurred; what is the social and political context; in what 
way is it shaped by broader political issues? What the trauma lens 
does is to choose its victims on a moral basis of who is deserving. So 
why does this selectivity happen? The issue of urban insecurity in 
Buenos Aires highlights the political contradictions that can be hidden 
in popular solidarity around trauma and victims rights. In March 
2004 Axel Blumberg, a 23-year-old engineering student, was abducted 
for ransom in Buenos Aires. A few days later he was murdered. His 
father, Juan Carlos Blumberg, organised an enormous street protest for 
victim's rights against urban crime and insecurity, mobilizing massive 
support from across the social spectrum. But Blumberg'S solution to 
tackle urban crime involved the criminalisation and repression of 
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the urban poor - zero tolerance, preventive detention on the basis 
of suspicion - aimed at many of the very people who had marched 
with him against impunity and for victims' rights. The trauma lens 
produces the possibility of consensus around the shared recognition of 
a site in the suffering body but this does not usually mean connecting 
with the subjectivity and feelings of victims. The consensus is forged 
around symbolic events and through ritualised ideas about the duty 
to remember. There is often only a fairly shallow connection to the 
trauma of victims with solidarity forged around pity more than 
identification, or moral consensus around what wrong was done. 
Refugees 
The victim of political persecution has confronted increasing 
restrictions to the protection provided by the international UN 
Refugee Convention 1951, a widely ratified convention upholding the 
right to seek asylum. The inclusive human rights lens for protection 
is being undermined by a shrinking trauma lens, which is more and 
more suspicious of the authenticity of victims' suffering. Australian 
immigration and refugee policy has for a decade enacted policy 
designed to limit the ability of individual asylum seekers to be seen 
or heard in the legal system and in the court of Australian public 
opinion. Government policy on illegal boat arrivals has shaped the 
way asylum seekers have been criminalised as illegal entrants using 
people smugglers, has created the temporary protection visa as an 
in-between status and has excised the Australian migration zone 
to force refugee processing and assessment off-shore. The Labor 
Party's recent suspension of the processing of asylum claims of boat 
arrivals from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka for six months continues 
the same strategy of curtailing the protection provided by the 
Refugee Convention. Australian policy circumscribes rights as well 
as the sympathy and compassion we feel towards asylum seekers. 
It effectively silences victims by making their trauma invisible to 
the Australian public and courts through playing on fear and 
xenophobia in the Australian electorate. 
Proof of persecution has always been problematic. The narrative 
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of persecution is a story of violence. 1£ the story is not believed then 
wounds are more closely examined. Didier Fassin highlights the way 
that in France proof of the scar - in the form of the medical certificate 
- has become an important source of truth and legitimation. As the 
narrative truth is increasingly doubted there is a resort to an embodied 
truth in physical and psychological scars and for the certification of 
trauma as a medical fact. 
Asylum claims represent another example of where trauma and 
rights are brought to bear on recognising and entitling the victim. 
However, trauma becomes the basis for calibrating suffering and 
creating a hierarchy of victims in order to limit the number who 
are recognised as entitled to refugee status - i.e., fit the category of 
legitimate victim. So victims get marginalised if their stories don't 
resonate as truthful or they don't seem to belong, or they belong to 
the wrong category, or they can't prove the truth of trauma in their 
body. In addition, denying one person the truth of his or her asylum 
claim can have a consequence of denying the history of a whole group 
of people. So by talking about the arrival of boats from Sri Lanka in 
terms of the effectiveness of border control policies as an effective 
deterrent, in effect denies the truth of the nature of long-term war 
between the Sri Lankan government and Tamils. The justification for 
suspending the processing of asylum applications of boat arrivals 
now is that the political conditions in Sri Lanka and in Afghanistan 
have improved - the end of war in the former and the surge to defeat 
the Taliban in the latter. So the conflict, the basis of their claims for 
protection and source of their trauma, is declared invalid as grounds 
for granting protection. 
My main point here is that trauma, which has not been sufficiently 
recognised as universalising discourse, and the human rights 
discourse are both potentially inclusive but become the basis for 
differentiation or the division of people. The traumatic event is 
apparently made accessible to others through the subjectivity, memory 
and feelings of the victim. However, while victims speak on the 
basis of their experience they are heard through a filtering moral 
economy of trauma. Victims' testimony becomes enmeshed in forms 
of governance and governmentality. In other words, the construction 
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of the victim, the conceptualisation of the events, the validity of the 
memory and the moral criteria of recognition circumscribe what is 
heard rather than proceeding on the basis of the universal recognition 
of suffering or rights. 
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